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Abstract 
We propose a generalized market equilibrium model using assignment game criteria for evaluating 
transportation systems that consist of both operators’ and users’ decisions. The model finds stable 
pricing, in terms of generalized costs, and matches between user populations in a network to set 
of routes with line capacities. The proposed model gives a set of stable outcomes instead of single 
point pricing that allows operators to design ticket pricing, routes/schedules that impact 
access/egress, shared policies that impact wait/transfer costs, etc., based on a desired mechanism 
or policy. The set of stable outcomes is proven to be convex from which assignment-dependent 
unique user-optimal and operator-optimal outcomes can be obtained. Different user groups can 
benefit from using this model in a prescriptive manner or within a sequential design process. We 
look at several different examples to test our model: small examples of fixed transit routes and a 
case study using a small subset of taxi data in NYC. The case study illustrates how one can use the 
model to evaluate a policy that can require passengers to walk up to 1 block away to meet with a 
shared taxi without turning away passengers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Planning for mobility in a smart cities era requires an understanding beyond the route choices 
of travelers. With the increasing ubiquity of multiple forms of “Mobility as a Service” (MaaS) 
options to travelers (e.g. conventional fixed route transit, flexible transit, rideshare, carshare, 
microtransit, ridesourcing) provided by both public agencies and private operators known as 
“transportation network companies” (TNCs), travel forecast models need to focus on both the 
decisions of travelers and operators (Djavadian and Chow, 2017a). For example, a person’s 
decision to take one mobility service over another may depend on the travel performance of that 
service, but the performance in turn depends on the operator’s cost allocation decisions to best 
serve their users. Table 1 illustrates the broad range of cost allocation decisions exemplified by 
different types of mobility systems and how those decisions impacts costs for users and operators.  
 
Table 1. Illustration of cost allocations 
Cost allocation Cost transfer Example systems 
Fare User → Operator Public transit, taxi, on-demand ridesharing, vehicle sharing 
Wait time Operator → User Public transit, taxi, on-demand ridesharing 
Access time Operator → User Public transit, vehicle sharing 
Detour time User → User Public transit, on-demand ridesharing 
Reservation time Operator → User Vehicle sharing, on-demand ridesharing 
Capacity reliability Operator → User Public transit, vehicle sharing 
Credit/discount for switching 
pickup/drop-off location 
Operator → User Public transit, on-demand ridesharing, vehicle sharing 
Fare splitting User → User Public transit, on-demand ridesharing 
 
In this table, cost transfers refer to the direction of cost allocation: for example, a fare is a cost 
to a user that is transferred as a benefit to the operator. When planning for these systems, modelers 
need to forecast the outcomes of operators’ cost allocation policies to forecast the route flows. The 
success and failure of various systems (e.g. Kutsuplus in Helsinki (Kelly, 2016), Car2Go in San 
Diego (Krok, 2016)) depend on forecasting the ridership, which is linked to the cost allocation 
decisions of those systems and the structure of other mobility options in their respective regions.  
State-of-the-art techniques tend to keep these two decisions separate. For example, traffic or 
transit equilibrium models in general are designed without any operator response to obtain route 
flows that satisfy Wardrop user equilibrium principles. Using conventional transportation 
assignment methods, highly complex bilevel models with upper level Nash equilibrium are needed 
(e.g. Zhou et al., 2005). There are models to forecast certain equilibrium patterns like taxi-
passenger matching (Yang et al., 2010) and ride-sourcing supply-demand equilibrium (Zha et al., 
2016). The problem is that such methods do not allow city agencies to evaluate across multiple 
service types to compare alternatives and substitution effects between service designs. 
System optimization models like vehicle sharing (Chow and Sayarshad, 2014) or ridesharing 
optimization (Masoud and Jayakrishnan, 2017; Wang et al., 2017) assume inelastic user demand. 
Those are generally normative models meant to be decision support for the operators, not as policy 
analysis tools for public agencies. An overview of this gap in the literature is given by Djavadian 
and Chow (2017a, b), who also propose simulation-based methods to evaluate such systems. 
However, a major drawback is that sensitivity analyses cannot be conducted, and the fundamental 
structure of the interactions is not clearly understood. For instance, the stability of a certain cost 
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allocation strategy may be simulated, but the tool does not provide analytical thresholds to consider 
perturbations in a strategy or for transferability to other instances.  
 We propose a new transportation network assignment model framework based on stable 
matching for this purpose; it simultaneously considers user route behavior, service operator route 
selection decisions, and the resulting cost allocations and pricing mechanisms needed to reach a 
stable state. Having such a model allows operators to quantify the impacts of fleet operational 
algorithms in terms of user incentives, such as those requesting passengers to meet at pickup 
locations to reduce routing costs. Policymakers can also use such a model to analyze infrastructure 
policies that impact those operators, such as congestion pricing or allocated parking spaces for 
shared mobility services. Stable matching theory (Gale and Shapley, 1962) shows equilibrium 
between two disjoint sets (buyers and sellers). If transport services are the sellers and travelers are 
the buyers, finding their supply-demand equilibrium is a stable matching problem in a generalized 
sense. However, the theory does not currently extend to matches made by travelers to links of a 
route. This is needed to apply stable matching to route assignment models. 
We generalize a prescriptive many-to-one assignment game to consider routes with multiple 
segments with line capacities for offline operating design analysis. The model formulation and 
solution method are also proposed to address stable matching of travelers to links of operator routes 
to help design systems where decision-makers have full or partial control of the assignment and/or 
cost allocation decisions. Variants of the model are proposed. We then demonstrate the 
applicability of the model to evaluate a public policy: if we explicitly consider user and operator 
incentives, what does the stable state for a shared taxi policy (Hu, 2017) look like in New York 
City? Our model can provide new insights that prior studies (e.g. Santi et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2017; 
Alonso-Mora et al., 2017) missed.  
 
 
2. Review of assignment games 
 
The stable matching problem has a long literature. Gale and Shapley (1962) first studied the 
problem through two applications: the “marriage problem” for one-to-one matching, and the 
“college admissions problem” for many-to-one matching. Shapley and Shubik (1971) formulated 
a linear program (LP) called the “assignment game” for matching problems that have transferable 
utilities. The “game” aspect refers to a cooperative game in which the splitting of the payoffs 
among the participants are made to ensure that they have sufficient incentives not to deviate. They 
showed that the region derived from the dual variables corresponding to the LP of the assignment 
game is “Core”, where players do not have incentive to change their matched partner(s).  
Consider two disjoint sets denoted by 𝑃 for buyers and 𝑄 for sellers. A buyer 𝑖 ∈ 𝑃 that 
matches with a seller 𝑗 ∈ 𝑄 earns a utility of  𝑈𝑖𝑗. The item has a cost of production of 𝑐𝑗 for seller 
𝑗. A successful match means the seller transfers the utility to the buyer with a price 𝑝. The 
difference between utility and cost of production can be interpreted as payoff 𝑎𝑖𝑗 =
max(0, 𝑈𝑖𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗). Each buyer who satisfies her utility earns a profit from the difference between 
utility and the price of the item, 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖𝑗 − 𝑝. Each seller profits from the price sold minus the 
cost of production, 𝑣𝑗 = 𝑝 − 𝑐𝑗. The assignment game is essentially a game of outcome splitting. 
It is a cooperative game (𝑃, 𝑄, 𝑎) wherein the players get payoffs by forming coalitions with each 
other. Each pair of 𝑖 and 𝑗 who make a coalition win a payoff with the value of 𝑎𝑖𝑗. The goal in the 
assignment game is to match sellers and buyers in a way that the generated payoff from their 
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coalitions is maximized. A review of the basic principles of the assignment game is provided in 
Roth and Sotomayor (1990). The assignment model formulation is shown here in Eq.(1)-(4).  
 
max∑∑𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑗∈𝑄𝑖∈𝑃
  (1) 
s.t.   
∑𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑖∈𝑃
≤ 𝑞𝑗 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑄 (2) 
∑𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑤𝑖
𝑗∈𝑄
 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑃 (3) 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑄, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑃 (4) 
 
In the model, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is a binary variable which shows whether buyer 𝑖 and seller 𝑗 are matched 
or not. The parameters 𝑞𝑗 and 𝑤𝑖 are the quotas of each side. If 𝑞𝑗 and 𝑤𝑖 are equal to one, the 
assignment game becomes a one-to-one or simple assignment game. For any integer values of 𝑞𝑗 
and 𝑤𝑖, the constraint set conforms to the Unimodularity Theorem, so the optimal solution of the 
LP relaxation is also integer.  
In the simple assignment game, an outcome ((𝑢, 𝑣); 𝑥) is feasible if 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑗 are non-negative 
and under a feasible assignment 𝑥 (i.e. 𝑥 satisfies Eq. (2) - (4)), ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑖∈𝑃 + ∑ 𝑣𝑗𝑗∈𝑄 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑖∈𝑃
𝑗∈𝑄
. 
A feasible payoff is stable if 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗 when 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1, and 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑗 ≥ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 when 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0. The 
core is the set of solutions of the dual corresponding to the assignment game. Note that this is not 
equivalent to Wardrop’s user equilibrium and system optimal concepts which refer to competition 
between users when payoffs depend on their collective choices. Here we are looking at cooperation 
between buyers and sellers such that the outcome is consistent with behavior. 
In the multiple partner assignment game (Sotomayor, 1992), the profit received by buyer 𝑖 
(seller 𝑗) from matching to seller 𝑗 (buyer 𝑖) is defined as 𝑢𝑖𝑗 (𝑣𝑖𝑗). The unmatched buyers and 
sellers are assumed to be matched to a dummy seller or buyer, respectively (𝑥𝑖𝑗0 and 𝑥𝑖0𝑗), with a 
payoff of zero. If  𝐶(𝑖, 𝑥) and 𝐶(𝑗, 𝑥) are defined as the set of matched players to 𝑖 and 𝑗, 
respectively, under optimal assignment of 𝑥, then 𝑢𝑖 is the minimum of 𝑢𝑖𝑗 for each 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶(𝑖, 𝑥) 
and 𝑣𝑗 is the minimum of 𝑣𝑖𝑗 for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶(𝑗, 𝑥). Stability of payoffs in the many-to-many 
assignment games implies that the feasible outcome ((𝑢, 𝑣); 𝑥) is stable if 𝑢𝑖𝑗 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗 when 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1 and 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑗 ≥ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 when 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0, where 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑗 are non-negative for all 𝑖 and 𝑗. 
Furthermore, for the many-to-one game the stable matching outcomes correspond to the core of 
the assignment game such that there exists “buyer optimal” and a “seller optimal” outcomes.  
 The main challenge in a transportation network context is defining a many-to-one model 
structure where sellers are defined as routes with line capacities and multiple travelers are matched 
to segments of each route. We use the term “line” in reference to service lines (see Schöbel, 2012; 
Schiewe et al., 2019) on a route. For example, a route may serve 100 passengers in total but have 
a line capacity of 10 so that the number never exceeds that amount at any segment and direction, 
and three lines with the same line capacity may share an infrastructure link such that it cannot 
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exceed 30 passengers on that link. This is the case with MaaS systems. Two different users can 
match to a route using two different node pairs but share the same line level “quotas” or capacities, 
all while maintaining a unique stable outcome space. These points are illustrated in more detail in 
Section 3. 
 While there are transportation applications using stable matching, cost allocation mechanisms, 
or cooperative game theory as shown in Table 2, none have considered both of the following: (1) 
assignment of travelers onto an operator route that can be composed of a sequence of nodes with 
line capacities, and (2) route-level cost allocation decisions of operators. 
 
Table 2. Sample literature on transportation applications of stable matching, cost allocation mechanisms, and 
cooperative games. 
Reference Type of network Allocation decision Mechanism 
Bird (1976) 
Minimum spanning 
tree 
Core of Minimum spanning tree 
game 
Set of stable allocations 
in core 
Megiddo (1978) Steiner tree Demand nodes in Euclidian space Core of Steiner tree 
Kalai and Zemel (1982) Maximum flow Each player owns a single link 
Core of maximum flow 
game 
Derks and Tijs (1985) 
Multicommodity 
flow 
Each player owns a single link, 
different commodity 
Core of multicommodity 
flow game 
Curiel et al. (1989) Maximum flow 
Committee owns links and decide 
together 
Core of maximum flow 
in centralized case 
Granot and Granot 
(1992) 
Maximum flow N.A N.A. 
Matsubayashi et al. 
(2005) 
Node pair 
two types of cost, constant + 
coalition 
Set of stable cost 
allocation in core 
Potters et al. (2006) Minimum cost flow Players own link Nucleolus of flow game 
Agarwal and Ergun 
(2008) 
Network 
Players own capacities on links 
and also demands then cooperate 
There is no cost 
allocation 
Anshelevich et al. (2013) Bipartite 
Utility as a random value, cost of 
stability 
N.A. 
Dai and Chen (2015) Nodes 
Finding profit allocation inside 
core, efficiency measure 
Profit allocation is done 
by egalitarian view 
Stiglic et al. (2015) Route 
Finding meeting point with 
minimizing cost 
Matching demand to 
routes through matching 
problem 
Hezarkhani et al. (2016) Route Cooperative truck load delivery 
Gain sharing is done in a 
procedure to be fare 
Nourinejad and Roorda 
(2016) 
Network  
Decentralized and centralized 
models for dynamic ridesharing  
Single-shot first-price 
Vickrey auction price 
Aghajani and Kalantar 
(2017) 
N.A. Maximizing parking owner profit Seller side optimal 
Alonso-Mora et al. 
(2017) Network  
Algorithm for dynamic 
ridesharing matching and 
relocation of idle cars 
No cost allocation 
Hara and Hato (2017) 
Node Auction for car/bike sharing 
Giving incentives to 
avoid imbalance problem 
Masoud et al. (2017) 
Node and routes 
(matching p2p 
ridesharing system) 
Rider is charged for costs 
Two types of cost: fixed 
cost (deviation from 
main route), variable 
cost (distance based) 
Qian et al. (2017) 
Network of NYC 
and taxi data 
Incentives to taxi riders to share 
their cab 
Best incentive that 
maximize efficiency of 
GRG 
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Rosenthal (2017) Network 
Cooperative game to cost 
allocating in rapid transit 
Equally sharing 
Wang et al. (2017) Route 
Dynamic ridesharing, matching 
individual cars to each other 
Cost is divided equally 
between two matched 
pair 
Lu and Quadrifoglio 
(2019) 
Bipartite 
Finding fair cost allocation for 
ridesharing services 
They designed an 
algorithm to find 
Nucleolus 
Papakonstantinou et al. 
(2019) 
Network 
Cooperative game between 
counties to mitigate sea level rise 
risk 
Generated cost is divided 
fairly using Shapley 
Value 
Peng et al. (2018) Bipartite 
Matching passengers and drivers 
with constraints 
The pricing considering 
equity and incentive, is 
designed to ensure 
stability 
 
One area of the literature needs further elaboration. Coalition formation in networks is called 
a “network flow game”. These studies deal with how multiple operators that own links in a network 
can form coalitions with each other to allow flows to occur. Examples include Bird’s (1976) study 
for minimum spanning trees, Megiddo (1978) for Steiner trees, Kalai and Zemel (1982) for 
maximum flow problems, and Derks and Tijs (1985) for multicommodity flows. Modifications to 
the control scheme also exist. Curiel et al. (1989) allowed a group of operators to own a link with 
“committee control”. Agarwal and Ergun (2008) allowed operators to own capacity on links 
instead of the whole links themselves. While network flow games also deal with cooperative games 
and coalition formation, the models are designed to analyze only interactions between different 
operators with each other. Primary applications include airline and freight industries.  
On the contrary, the coalition formation in the proposed model is between travelers and the 
operators because the model is primarily designed to quantitatively analyze cost allocation policies 
between them, such as fare prices, reservation times, detours, and meeting points. This is 
fundamentally a different model framework than earlier “network flow games”, even if both 
involve assignment games. In the case where travelers choose multiple operators to form a trip, a 
combination of both network flow game between multiple operators and user-to-operator stable 
matching may be required. This “many-to-many” extension will be studied in the future. 
 
3. Proposed model 
 
3.1. Definitions and model formulation 
Unlike conventional transportation assignment models, the proposed model outputs not only 
traveler route flows and link performances, but also the set of stable cost allocations at the operator 
route level (fare prices, other generalized traveler cost transfers like additional walking or waiting 
time, etc.). It explicitly considers the incentive behavior of both travelers and operators. The model 
is used to evaluate service operating policies illustrated in Table 1 by determining stability of a 
policy and its cost allocation bounds for given demand patterns. 
 The most basic formulation setting is a static many-to-one (one operator route may match with 
multiple travelers, and one traveler is assigned to one route) assignment game. Consider a graph 
𝐺(𝑁, 𝐴) in which there is a set 𝑅 of mobility operators’ routes, where each route 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 is assumed 
to represent a separate “seller” and a set 𝑆 of user OD pairs looking for service. Each OD pair 𝑠 
may include more than one traveler and be matched to multiple routes although each traveler 
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individually can only be assigned to one route (integer solutions). A dummy user 𝑘 is created to 
match with routes that are not matched with any user. A route 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 is assumed to have only one 
sequence of links 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑟 between any pair of nodes served, where 𝐴𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴 are disjoint sets. For 
example, for a 4-node network, one route may be 1-2-3-4, and another may be 3-2-1-4. A user that 
travels from node 1 to node 4 would have to visit 2, 3, and 4 if matched with the first route, and 
only node 4 if matched with the latter.  
 The following input parameters are needed. A match between an operator route 𝑟 and a user 
or set of homogenous users 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 imposes a generalized travel cost to the user(s), 𝑡𝑠𝑟, that depends 
on the origin-destination (OD) of user 𝑠. Such a cost, for example, may be a function of multiple 
travel costs that include fares, wait time, access time, in-vehicle time, etc. This cost may be 
different for one user than another matched to the same route. For example, a user traveling from 
node 1 to node 4 on route 1-2-3-4 has a travel cost of visiting 2, 3, and then 4, whereas a traveler 
from node 2 to 3 on the same route would only incur a travel cost of visiting 3. The cost is fixed 
(there is no crowding effect on the line, just a hard capacity). Each user gains a utility 𝑈𝑠𝑟 when 
matched to a route 𝑟 such that the net payoff is 𝑎𝑠𝑟 = max⁡{0, 𝑈𝑠𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑟}. When we set the utility 
for the next best travel option outside of the available options among 𝑅 to be zero, the 𝑈𝑠𝑟 is 
defined so the payoff 𝑎𝑠𝑟 represents the savings from that outside option. For a traveler with no 
other travel options (or if 𝑅 comprehensively includes all possible travel options), the next best 
travel option is simply to not make a trip in this system. Note that if user 𝑠 and route 𝑟 are not 
compatible pairs, we can model this with a very large travel cost (𝑡𝑠𝑟) so that it makes their payoff 
value (𝑎𝑠𝑟) equal to zero. 
If we define 𝑏𝑠𝑟 to be the minimum benefit acceptable for operator 𝑟 to match with user 𝑠, 
and 𝑔𝑠𝑟 as the minimum acceptable benefit for user 𝑠 to match with route 𝑟, then the payoff value 
is 𝑎𝑠𝑟 = max⁡{0, 𝑈𝑠𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑟 − 𝑔𝑠𝑟 − 𝑏𝑠𝑟}. These minimum acceptable values just make the payoff 
values smaller and all the rest of characteristics of the proposed model remain same. Without a 
loss of generality, for the rest of this paper we assume the minimum acceptable profit for both 
users and operators is equal to zero. 
Each route has an operating cost 𝐶𝑟 which requires the operator payoff allocation to exceed. 
For private operators, the fare payment portion of the allocation needs to exceed 𝐶𝑟 as some of the 
other user payoffs like travel time savings may not be transferable to offset operating cost. The 
cost of a route is divided between the users of that route (𝑐𝑠𝑟). Routes have line capacities defined 
as 𝑤𝑟. An indicator 𝛿𝑎𝑠𝑟 is set to 1 if a match between user 𝑠 and route 𝑟 requires using link 𝑎, and 
0 otherwise.  
The output of the model is a set of matches 𝑥𝑠𝑟 and the region of user profits 𝑢𝑠 and operator 
profits 𝑣𝑟 that are stable. For a given set of user and operator profits, there is a fare 𝑝𝑠 charged to 
the user by the matching route. The proposed model’s formulation for single traveler OD pairs is 
shown in Eq. (5) - (9).  
 
max∑∑𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆
  (5) 
s.t.   
∑𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅
≤ 1 ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆\{𝑘} (6) 
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∑ 𝛿𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
≤ 𝑤𝑟 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑟 , 𝑟 ∈ R (7) 
∑ 𝑥𝑠𝑟 ≤ 𝑀(1 − 𝑥𝑘𝑟)
𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
 ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 (8) 
𝑥𝑠𝑟 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 (9) 
 
Eq. (5) is the standard assignment game objective to maximize payoffs. Eq. (6) and (7) correspond 
to the matching quotas for a many-to-one assignment game. The line capacity for the route 
operators is met on their lines. Eq. (8) is a new constraint that ensures the routes are only matched 
if the sum of all the matched payoff allocations exceeds the operating cost. Eq. (9) are the integral 
constraints. By setting 𝑎𝑘𝑟 = 𝐶𝑟 , ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, a route would only be matched if the total payoff (in 
generalized user utility converted to operating dollars) exceeds the operating cost because of Eq. 
(8). 
For the cases that have a set 𝐻 of user (OD) demand greater than one, we can easily set the 
right side of Eq. (6) equal to 𝑞𝑠 as the demand value and consider 𝑥𝑠𝑟 as an integer (𝑥𝑠𝑟 ∈ ℤ+). 
While this may seem like a many-to-many system since one OD pair may be matched to multiple 
routes, behaviorally it is still a many-to-one system because the matching condition is for each 
traveler to be matched to one route. For the stability of such cases we can simply separate the user 
bundle 𝑠 to |𝐻| single user (OD) and treat each of them as a single independent agent (integer 
solution).  
Figure 1 illustrates the model setting; based only on travel costs (as typically done in traffic 
assignment models) “Feasible Output 2” seems to be the preferred choice, but based on the choices 
of other passengers, the operating cost 𝐶𝑟, and the savings from other travel options, “Feasible 
Output 1” might be the chosen one. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of explaining different assignment configurations using the proposed model. 
 
The payoff value used in the objective function in Eq. (5) is defined as 𝑎𝑠𝑟 = max⁡{0, 𝑈𝑠𝑟 −
𝑡𝑠𝑟}, where 𝑈𝑠𝑟 is the utility attained by the user for matching with a route, converted to units of 
dollars, and 𝑡𝑠𝑟 is a generalized travel disutility to the user that can include monetary values of 
wait time, access time, or any other costs not transferred to the operator.  The travel disutility may 
take any functional form as best fit to the data. The classic payoff value defined in Shapley and 
Shubick (1971) is 𝑎𝑠𝑟 = max⁡{0, 𝑈𝑠𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑟 − 𝑐𝑠𝑟}, where 𝑐𝑠𝑟 is the cost of operating the route 
attributed to the user. The issue is that 𝑐𝑠𝑟 is an endogenous variable that is a function of 𝑥𝑠𝑟 and 
a cost sharing mechanism; for example, two users sharing a ride can divide the cost of providing 
that trip as opposed to one user paying for the total cost alone. We claim that our model is 
equivalent to the case in Shapley and Shubik (1971) under Assumption 1, which only requires that 
the cost sharing mechanism be equal to any sum between users. We show this in Proposition 1. 
 
Assumption 1. Operating cost 𝐶𝑟 can be divided among different 𝑐𝑠𝑟 for each user 𝑠 that is 
matched to 𝑟, i.e. there exists a set of 𝑐𝑠𝑟 such that 𝐶𝑟 = ∑ 𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘} .  
 
Proposition 1. The objective function of model (5) – (9), (𝑎𝑠𝑟 = max⁡{0, 𝑈𝑠𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑟}), is equivalent 
to the objective function of the classic assignment model that defined in Shapley and Shubik (1971) 
with explicitly known production costs (𝑎𝑠𝑟 = max⁡{0, 𝑈𝑠𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑟 − 𝑐𝑠𝑟}).. 
 
Proof.  
Objective function of model (5) - (9) can be written as Eq.(10). 
 
Model inputs Feasible Output 1 
 
1 
  
2 
  
1 
  
2 
1 
2 3 
4 5 
6 7 
  
i 
j 
 
i 
Origin of user i 
Destination of user i 
Legend 
Node j on a route 
  
2 
5 
6 7 
  
1 
  
1 
1 
2 3 
  
2 
Each output… 
Flow? (𝑥𝑠𝑟)  
Price? (𝑝𝑠𝑟) 
User performance? (𝑢𝑠𝑟) 
Operator performance? (𝑣𝑟𝑠) 
 
  
2 
  
2 
2 3 
  
1 
  
1 
6 7 
Feasible Output 2 
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max∑∑𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆
= max( ∑ ∑(𝑈𝑠𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑟)𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
+∑𝐶𝑟𝑥𝑘𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅
)  (10) 
 
The right hand side of Eq. (10) consists of two parts. The second part is the total route cost 
of unused routes. Let’s define ?̅? ⊂ 𝑅 as the set of used routes. Then the second part of Eq. (10) 
can be written as Eq. (11). 
 
∑𝐶𝑟𝑥𝑘𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅
=∑𝐶𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅
−∑𝐶𝑟
𝑟∈?̅?
  (11) 
 
Now the objective function of the main model (Eq. (5)) can be rewritten again as Eq. (12). 
 
max∑∑𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆
= max( ∑ ∑(𝑈𝑠𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑟)𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
+∑𝐶𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅
−∑𝐶𝑟
𝑟∈?̅?
) 
 (12) 
 
The term ∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑟∈𝑅  is constant and can be eliminated from objective function (12). Based on 
what is defined, ∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑟∈?̅?  can be written as ∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}𝑟∈𝑅 . Eq. (12) becomes Eq.(13). 
 
max( ∑ ∑(𝑈𝑠𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑟)𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
−⁡∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}𝑟∈𝑅
)
= max( ∑ ∑(𝑈𝑠𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑟 − 𝑐𝑠𝑟)𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
) 
 (13) 
 
This net payoff is equivalent to Shapley and Shubik (1971).∎    
 
 The utility parameter 𝑈𝑠𝑟 needs to be accurately calibrated in advance. For user groups with 
𝑞𝑠 > 1, this parameter should be representative of a population. The value depends on the presence 
of other transport options outside of the set of 𝑅 being considered, and on the types of trip purposes 
at the destination. For example, the utility of a non-compulsory trip may be compared primarily to 
not making a trip at all, whereas a compulsory work trip may have a utility based on comparing 
against another travel mode even if only walking is available. Parameter estimation for 
mathematical programming models can be done using inverse optimization (Ahuja and Orlin, 
2001; Xu et al., 2018).  
 
3.2. Stable matching properties 
 The optimal solution to the assignment game determines the assignment of users and operators 
to each other as well as the cost allocation space. Let’s consider a cost transfer (e.g. fare price, 
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among others shown in Table 1) from user 𝑠 to operator route 𝑟, 𝑝𝑠𝑟, and 𝑣𝑟𝑠 be the profit that 
operator 𝑟 earns from serving user 𝑠. By definition, 𝑝𝑠𝑟 = 𝑐𝑠𝑟 + 𝑣𝑟𝑠. Let 𝑢𝑠 be the value gained by 
user 𝑠 from matching. 
Cost allocation between the users and operators should lead to a stable outcome. Before 
starting to define the stability criteria, let us define the notation used. We define 𝐷(𝑟, 𝑥) as the set 
of users that are unmatched to 𝑟⁡under 𝑥 assignment, 𝐶(𝑟, 𝑥) as the set of users that are matched 
to 𝑟 (except the unmatched quota we assumed that are matched to null user) (𝐷(𝑟, 𝑥) ∪ 𝐶(𝑟, 𝑥) =
𝑆\{𝑘}). The same definitions hold for 𝐷(𝑠, 𝑥) and 𝐶(𝑠, 𝑥). As defined earlier ?̅? is the set of routes 
that are matched to at least one user. 𝑣𝑟 = ∑ 𝑣𝑟𝑠𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥)  is the total benefit that route 𝑟 gains from 
its matches in assignment 𝑥. 
 
Definition 1. (Sotomayor, 1992) Outcomes 𝑢𝑠 and 𝑣𝑟 are feasible and denoted by ((𝑢, 𝑣); 𝑥) if: 
(i) ∑ 𝑢𝑠𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥) + 𝑣𝑟 = ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥) − 𝐶𝑟 and 𝑢𝑠 ≥ 0, 𝑣𝑟 ≥ 0  ∀𝑟 ∈ ?̅?⁡  
(ii) 𝑣𝑟 = 0 ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅\?̅? 
(iii) 𝑢𝑠 = 0⁡⁡⁡∀⁡𝑠⁡𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ⁡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡⁡𝐶(𝑠, 𝑥) = ∅ 
 
Definition 2. (Core) A feasible outcome ((𝑢, 𝑣), 𝑥) of the assignment game in Eq. (5) - (9) is stable 
if it satisfies Eq. (14). 
 
∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐺𝑟
+ 𝑣𝑟 ≥ ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟
𝑠∈𝐺𝑟
− 𝐶𝑟 ∀⁡𝐺𝑟⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 (14) 
 
where 𝐺𝑟 is set of user groups that can be feasibly matched to route 𝑟 (i.e. satisfies constraint of 
Eq. (7)).  
 
This stability condition ensures that no other coalition of users can make a better payoff than the 
current assignment solution and outcome allocation. Based on the definitions, the amount of 
generalized cost that users transfer to operators, 𝑝𝑠𝑟, depends on the values allocated to operators, 
𝑣𝑟𝑠, and the 𝑎𝑠𝑟 which is obtained from the utilities. 
To clarify the definitions of stability and feasibility of outcomes, we show them in a small 
example shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Users and routes interaction in stability. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, suppose there is a set of three routes {𝑟1 = (1 → 3 → 2 → 5 → 4 →
6), 𝑟2 = (3 → 6), 𝑟3 = (5 → 4)} where each has a quota of 2 on each of its links, and a set of four 
users 𝑆 = {(1,6), (3,2), (5,4), (3,6)}. Under assignment 𝑥, 𝑠1,⁡𝑠2,⁡𝑠3 and 𝑠4 are respectively 
matched to routes 𝑟1, 𝑟1,⁡𝑟1 and 𝑟2. Then we have: 𝐶(𝑟1, 𝑥) = {𝑠1,⁡𝑠2, 𝑠3}, 𝐶(𝑟2, 𝑥) = {𝑠4}, 
𝐶(𝑟3, 𝑥) = ∅ and 𝐷(𝑟1, 𝑥) = {𝑠4}, 𝐷(𝑟2, 𝑥) = {𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3}, 𝐷(𝑟3, 𝑥) = {𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3, 𝑠4}. The equations 
for stability and feasibility conditions for this example are shown below. 
 
Conditions for Feasibility 
(𝑢1 + 𝑢2 + 𝑢3) + 𝑣1 = (𝑎11 + 𝑎21 + 𝑎31) − 𝐶1 
𝑢4 + 𝑣2 = 𝑎42 − 𝐶2 
𝑣3 = 0 
𝑢1, 𝑢2, 𝑢3, 𝑢4, 𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3 ≥ 0 
  
Conditions for Stability 
(𝑢1) + 𝑣1 ≥ (𝑎11) − 𝐶1 (𝑢2 + 𝑢3) + 𝑣1 ≥ (𝑎21 + 𝑎31) − 𝐶1 
(𝑢2) + 𝑣1 ≥ (𝑎21) − 𝐶1 (𝑢1 + 𝑢2 + 𝑢3) + 𝑣1 ≥ (𝑎11 + 𝑎21 + 𝑎31) − 𝐶1 
(𝑢3) + 𝑣1 ≥ (𝑎31) − 𝐶1 (𝑢1 + 𝑢4) + 𝑣1 ≥ (𝑎11 + 𝑎41) − 𝐶1 
(𝑢1 + 𝑢2) + 𝑣1 ≥ (𝑎11 + 𝑎21) − 𝐶1 (𝑢4) + 𝑣1 ≥ (𝑎41) − 𝐶1 
(𝑢1 + 𝑢3) + 𝑣1 ≥ (𝑎11 + 𝑎31) − 𝐶1 (𝑢3) + 𝑣3 ≥ (𝑎33) − 𝐶3 
 
 
Proposition 2. The set of stable outcomes for the assignment game in Eq. (5) – (9) consists of a 
convex space. 
 
Proof. 
The proof follows directly from the fact that the set of stable outcomes is defined by a set of linear 
constraints (Eq. (14) and feasibility definition) so the space of stable outcomes is convex. ∎ 
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We can now establish the necessary and sufficient conditions to relate an optimal assignment to a 
stable outcome with Proposition 3. Furthermore, it is known assignments and even the dual 
variables corresponding to the line capacities can be non-unique (e.g. Larsson and Patriksson, 
1999); we show that non-unique assignments nonetheless share the same stable outcome space 
with Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 3. Assignment x corresponding to stable outcome ((𝑢, 𝑣); 𝑥) satisfying Eq. (14) is an 
optimal assignment solution to the assignment problem in Eq. (5) – (9). 
 
Proof. 
Stability of outcomes in assignment 𝑥 with respect to any other assignment 𝑥′ implies that 
  
∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥′)
+ 𝑣𝑟 ≥ ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥′)
− 𝐶𝑟 = ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
′
𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
− 𝐶𝑟 ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 (15) 
 
Summation of Eq. (15) over all the 𝑟 ∈ ?̅? in 𝑥′ results in Eq. (16). 
 
∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
+∑𝑣𝑟
𝑟∈?̅?
≥ ∑ ∑𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
′
𝑟∈?̅?𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
−∑𝐶𝑟
𝑟∈?̅?
= ∑ ∑𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
′
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
−∑(1 − 𝑥𝑘𝑟
′ )𝐶𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅
 
 (16) 
 
Using the feasibility definition, the left side of Eq. (16) can be rewritten as Eq. (17). 
 
∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
+∑𝑣𝑟
𝑟∈?̅?
= ∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
+∑𝑣𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅
= ∑ ∑𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
−∑(1 − 𝑥𝑘𝑟)𝐶𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅
 
 (17) 
 
By inserting Eq. (17) into Eq. (16) we have Eq. (18). 
 
∑ ∑𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
−∑(1 − 𝑥𝑘𝑟)𝐶𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅
≥ ∑ ∑𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
′
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘}
−∑(1 − 𝑥𝑘𝑟
′ )𝐶𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅
  (18) 
 
Eq. (18) can be re-written in the form of Eq. (19). 
 
∑∑𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆
≥∑∑𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑥𝑠𝑟
′
𝑟∈𝑅𝑠∈𝑆
  (19) 
 
This means the objective function of assignment 𝑥 is better than any other assignment 𝑥′ which 
shows the optimality of assignment 𝑥.⁡⁡∎ 
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Proposition 4. Any optimal assignment solution 𝑥 to the assignment problem in Eq. (5) – (9) 
shares the same stable outcome area with every other optimal assignment solution 𝑥′. 
 
Proof. 
Let’s say we have two optimal assignment solutions 𝑥⁡and 𝑥′. If we show that the stable outcome 
((𝑢, 𝑣); 𝑥) is generally feasible for assignment 𝑥′ then we can say that ((𝑢, 𝑣); 𝑥) is also the stable 
space for assignment 𝑥′. 
From the stability condition we have Eq. (15) and summing up over all the routes 𝑟 we get the 
Eq. (16). Since the 𝑥′ is also an optimal solution, the Eq. (16) will be in the form of equality. This 
means that all the Eq. (15) also have the form of equality necessary for the feasibility of ((𝑢, 𝑣); 𝑥) 
for assignment 𝑥′. ∎ 
 
Lastly, we show with Proposition 5 that the stability conditions extend to a generalized assignment 
problem with multiple travelers per OD pair, i.e. when 𝑞𝑠 > 1. The proposition clarifies the 
distinction, from individual behavior in which users select different routes, to the Wardrop’s 
equilibrium that arises when identical travelers end up choosing different routes. In essence, the 
routes are chosen only if they are equivalent in value when considering the dual values of the link 
capacities. This proposition also maintains that the problem is strictly a many-to-one assignment 
game cast within a capacitated network context. 
 
Proposition 5. Identical users (like user demand sharing the same OD when 𝑞𝑠 > 1 for the user 
bundle version of assignment game in Eq. (5) – (9)) gain equal benefit from their match to different 
routes. 
 
Proof. 
In Proposition 4 we saw that all the stable outcomes are sharing the same stable outcome space. 
Let’s say the user bundle 𝑠 includes two agents 𝑒 and 𝑒′. In an optimal assignment solution 𝑥, 𝑒 is 
matched to route 𝑟 and 𝑒′ to 𝑟′ and in the other optimal assignment solution 𝑥′, 𝑒 is matched to 
route 𝑟′⁡ and 𝑒′ to 𝑟. Note that two agents 𝑒 and 𝑒′ are completely identical. Stability conditions 
for assignment 𝑥 implies Eq. (20) – (23). 
𝑢𝑒 + ∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥)\{𝑒}
+ 𝑣𝑟 = 𝑎𝑒𝑟 + ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥)\{𝑒}
− 𝐶𝑟 
(20) 
𝑢𝑒 + ∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟′,𝑥)\{𝑒′}
+ 𝑣𝑟′ ≥ 𝑎𝑒𝑟′ + ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟′
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟′,𝑥)\{𝑒′}
− 𝐶𝑟′ 
(21) 
𝑢𝑒′ + ∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟′,𝑥)\{𝑒′}
+ 𝑣𝑟′ = 𝑎𝑒′𝑟′ + ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟′
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟′,𝑥)\{𝑒′}
− 𝐶𝑟′ 
(22) 
𝑢𝑒′ + ∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥)\{𝑒}
+ 𝑣𝑟 ≥ 𝑎𝑒′𝑟 + ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥)\{𝑒}
− 𝐶𝑟 
(23) 
 
Stability condition for assignment 𝑥′ implies Eq. (24) – (27). 
  
𝑢𝑒 + ∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟′,𝑥′)\{𝑒}
+ 𝑣𝑟′ = 𝑎𝑒𝑟′ + ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟′
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟′,𝑥′)\{𝑒}
− 𝐶𝑟⁡ ′ 
(24) 
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𝑢𝑒 + ∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥′)\{𝑒′}
+ 𝑣𝑟 ≥ 𝑎𝑒𝑟 + ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥′)\{𝑒′}
− 𝐶𝑟 
(25) 
𝑢𝑒′ + ∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥′)\{𝑒′}
+ 𝑣𝑟 = 𝑎𝑒′𝑟 + ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥′)\{𝑒′}
− 𝐶𝑟 
(26) 
𝑢𝑒′ + ∑ 𝑢𝑠
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟′,𝑥′)\{𝑒}
+ 𝑣𝑟′ ≥ 𝑎𝑒′𝑟′ + ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟′
𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟′,𝑥′)\{𝑒}
− 𝐶𝑟′ 
(27) 
 
Since agents 𝑒 and 𝑒′ have the same characteristics, 𝑎𝑒𝑟 = 𝑎𝑒′𝑟 and 𝑎𝑒𝑟′ = 𝑎𝑒′𝑟′. From this and 
Eq. (20) - (27) we can say that 𝑢𝑒 = 𝑢𝑒
′ . ∎ 
 
 
3.3. Solution method 
The proposed model is conveniently cast as an integer programming problem with quota 
constraints, but with route flows for different OD pairs and line capacities. The model is a type of 
capacitated multicommodity flow problem, where the latter is known to be NP-hard (Even et al., 
1975) with unsplittable or discrete flows. Any conventional IP solution algorithm can be applied 
to solve this model and LP relaxation can be applied when allowing for continuous flows. There 
are several approaches which can be divided into three main categories of methods: cutting planes 
(e.g. reducing feasible area by adding extra constraints), heuristic methods (e.g. search methods, 
subgradient optimization, see Held et al., 1974), and implicit enumeration techniques (e.g. Branch 
and Bound, see Lawler and Wood, 1966).  
Having found a set of assignments, a stable cost sharing problem is expressed as Eq. (28) to 
(33). The decision variables are 𝑢𝑠 and 𝑣𝑟. Constraint (29) is related to definition of stability. The 
objective function max𝑍 represents a desired cost allocation mechanism, such as maximizing 
revenue, social welfare, fairness, etc.  
 
max𝑍  (28) 
s.t.   
∑ 𝑢𝑠𝑠∈𝐺𝑟 + 𝑣𝑟 ≥ ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑠∈𝐺𝑟 − 𝐶𝑟  ∀𝐺𝑟⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 (29) 
∑ 𝑢𝑠𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥) + 𝑣𝑟 = ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑠∈𝐶(𝑟,𝑥) − 𝐶𝑟  ∀⁡𝑟 ∈ ?̅? (30) 
𝑣𝑟 = 0  ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅\?̅? (31) 
𝑢𝑠 = 0⁡⁡ ∀𝑠⁡𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐶(𝑠, 𝑥) = ∅ (32) 
𝑢𝑠 ≥ 0, 𝑣𝑟 ≥ 0   ∀𝑟 ∈ ?̅? (33) 
 
When 𝑍 is set as either ∑ 𝑢𝑠𝑠∈𝑆  or ∑ 𝑣𝑟𝑟∈𝑅 , the solutions obtain the user-optimal and operator-
optimal outcomes, respectively. These two objective functions form opposite vertices of the space 
of the set of stable outcomes. Another objective function may obtain an outcome allocation that 
lies somewhere between these two bounds. Different cost allocation mechanisms may be used, 
although some may not result in allocations within this stable outcome space. By setting a desired 
mechanism we can use Eq. (28) – (33) to set prices for the assignment. When Z is linear, the 
resulting model is a simple LP for obtaining the cost allocations under the stable matching. 
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The stable cost allocation of this study is based on the definition of the core. A core is a strong 
stability condition that leads to two issues. First, as illustrated with the example in Figure 2, all the 
possible coalitions need to be checked so that they cannot generate more payoff than what they get 
in the core (Eq. (29)). Generation of all possible coalitions can be computationally expensive. On 
the other hand, the core may not always be non-empty. This can be advantageous in the design of 
a system because one that results in an empty core suggests there is no advantage for the operators 
to serve the users. In the next section, we show a numerical example where the core has different 
conditions with different parameters.  
The computational complexities of the assignment game and core allocation depend on the 
number of routes enumerated. Implicit enumeration techniques are the most obvious way to 
improve computational efficiency for large scale application. For example, Barnhart et al. (1994) 
proposed using column generation for implicit route enumeration to tackle large scale problems 
which we will investigate further in future research.  
 
3.4. Illustration with fixed route transit service 
3.4.1. Network parameters 
 To illustrate how this model works, we present a simple 4-node transit route network example 
shown in Figure 3. The number over each link in the figure represents the travel time between the 
nodes. In this network, we allow for all possible routes to be enumerated, of which there are 52 
candidate routes (𝑅 = {𝑟1, … ,  𝑟52}). We consider a cost structure based on the number of links in 
the route (a route with more links has higher operating cost), which is set to 𝐶𝑟 = 4.5 + 0.5 × |𝐴𝑟|. 
 
1
43
23
4 2
1.5
5 2
 
Figure 3. 4-node network example. 
 
Two different problem settings are considered. The first illustrates individuals with binary 
decisions where no capacity is assumed (𝑤𝑟 → ∞⁡). In the second case, for each “user” there is 
demand of 5 individuals for each OD pair. The line capacity is set to 2 in this latter case. These 
examples can be interpreted as transit routes that serve a population of travelers. In the 
computational experiments we set prices based on user-optimal (𝑍 = ∑ 𝑢𝑠𝑠∈𝑆\{𝑘} ) and operator-
optimal (𝑍 = ∑ 𝑣𝑟𝑟∈𝑅 ) mechanisms. Commercial optimization packages use one or combine some 
of these methods to solve the integer programming problems. For convenience we used Matlab’s 
intlinprog solver for the numerical examples in this study, as it uses a variant of the branch and 
bound algorithm to obtain a solution. 
 
3.4.2. Binary, non-capacitated case 
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A set of demand OD pairs between some of the OD pairs are randomly chosen (𝑆 =
{(1,2), (1,3), (2,3), (3,2), (4,1), (4,2)}) for this experiment. The utility (𝑈𝑟𝑠) for conducting each 
trip for all users is set constant (𝑈𝑠𝑟 = 𝑈 = 20⁡⁡⁡⁡∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆\{𝑘}, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅). 
 After solving the assignment model of Eq. (5) - (9), the optimal assignments is shown in Table 
3a and Figure 4. The objective value for the optimal assignment solution is 88.5. Solving the LP 
in Eq. (28) to (33) with 𝑍 equal to ∑ 𝑢𝑠𝑠∈𝑆  and ∑ 𝑣𝑟𝑟∈𝑅  results in the payoffs for user-optimal and 
operator-optimal cases as the ticket price relating to these two optimal payoffs are shown in Table 
3b and 3c. The 𝑍∗ for user- and operator-optimal objective values are 88.5 and 0.5 respectively. 
 
Table 3a. Result of assignment game for four node network 
𝑟 Users (O,D) 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟⁡ 
𝑜𝑓⁡𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 
Links⁡of⁡⁡route 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 
⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 
(1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (3,2) (4,1) (4,2) 
29 1 − 3 − 4 − 2 6  ∗  ∗  ∗ 
51 4 − 1 − 2 − 3 6 ∗  ∗  ∗  
 
Table 3b. Ticket prices in a user-optimal allocation mechanism 
Route Links of route 
Cost 
of 
route 
User ticket prices (O,D) 
Operator 
revenue (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (3,2) (4,1) (4,2) 
29 1 − 3 − 4 − 2 6  0.98  2.42  2.60 6 
51 4 − 1 − 2 − 3 6 2.24  2.79  0.97  6 
 
Table 3c. Ticket prices in an operator-optimal allocation mechanism 
Route Links of route 
Cost 
of 
route 
User ticket prices (O,D) 
Operator 
revenue (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (3,2) (4,1) (4,2) 
29 1 − 3 − 4 − 2 6  1  2.39  2.62 6.01 
51 4 − 1 − 2 − 3 6 2.65  2.85  0.98  6.48 
 
 
31 4 2
2
2
Route 29
4
4
1
1
6
6  
14 2 3
5
1
1
5
3
3
Route 51
 
s User s indicator
n Node n of network  
 
Figure 4. 4-node example user route matching in different optimal solutions. 
 
Based on feasibility of outcomes, matched partners have the following payoffs: 𝑢2 + 𝑢4 +
𝑢6 + 𝑣29 = 44.5; 𝑢1 + 𝑢3 + 𝑢5 + 𝑣51 = 44. Both 𝑏𝑟𝑠 and 𝑔𝑠𝑟 are assumed to be zero.  
The result for payoff splitting between the players is shown in Table 3b and 3c. In the user-
optimal allocation, the ticket prices are as small as possible and the operators gain no profit in this 
matching. On the contrary, in the operator-optimal allocation, the prices are set as high as possible. 
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Since the set of stable outcomes is convex, every other ticket price between these two ticket prices 
are also stable ticket prices. 
 
3.4.3. Integer, capacitated case 
 In this scenario, users from the prior setting are modified into user bundles with 𝑞𝑠 = 5⁡⁡∀𝑠 ∈
𝑆\{𝑘}. A line capacity is added to each route as well, where 𝑤𝑟 = 2, ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅.  
 The result of the assignment game is shown in Table 4 and Figure 5. In Figure 5 the number 
of passengers is written on the edge from user to network node. Due to capacity, some users switch 
to other operator routes. For this problem with these parameters, the set of stable outcomes is 
empty (Core is empty). It means that constraints of Eq. (29) to (33) do not contain any feasible 
area.  
Now consider a user group size of 𝑞𝑠 = 2⁡⁡∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆\{𝑘} instead. The assignment solution is 
shown in Table 5a. The optimal objective value is 187.5. The operator-optimal and user-optimal 
allocations from Eq. (28) to (33) for this case are shown in Table 5b, illustrating the stable outcome 
under operator- and user-optimal mechanisms. The value of 𝑍∗ for user- and operator-optimal 
objectives are 93.75 and 0 respectively. In this scenario, the outcomes for both the operator- and 
user-optimal mechanisms are identical which means the core is a single point. 
 
Table 4. Result of assignment for 4-node network with demand (𝒒𝒔 = 𝟓⁡⁡∀𝒔 ∈ 𝑺\{𝒌}) and route link capacity 
𝑟 User group (O,D) 
𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 
⁡𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 
Links⁡of⁡⁡route 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 
⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 
(1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (3,2) (4,1) (4,2) 
6 4 − 2 5      2 
7 1 − 3 − 2 5.5  2  2   
9 1 − 2 − 3 5.5 2  2    
25 4 − 1 − 2 5.5 2    2  
28 4 − 2 − 3 5.5   2   2 
29 1 − 3 − 4 − 2 6  1  1  1 
49 4 − 1 − 3 − 2 6  2  2 2  
51 4 − 1 − 2 − 3 6 1  1  1  
Total 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 
Table 5a. Result of assignment for 4-node network with demand (𝒒𝒔 = 𝟐⁡⁡∀𝒔 ∈ 𝑺\{𝒌}) and route link capacity 
𝑟 User group (O,D) 
𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 
⁡𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 
Links⁡of⁡⁡route 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 
⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 
(1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (3,2) (4,1) (4,2) 
1 1 − 2 5 2      
28 4 − 2 − 3 5.5   2   2 
49 4 − 1 − 3 − 2 6  2  2 2  
Total 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 
 
Table 5b. Ticket prices in operator-optimal and User-optimal allocation mechanisms 
Cost 
allocation 
mechanism 
Route Links of route 
Cost 
of 
route 
User group (O,D) 
Operator 
revenue (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (3,2) (4,1) (4,2) 
1 1 − 2 5 2.5      5 
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User 
optimal 
28 4 − 2 − 3 5.5   0.25   2.5 5.5 
49 4 − 1 − 3 − 2 6  0.46  2.29 0.25  6 
Operator 
optimal 
1 1 − 2 5 2.5      5 
28 4 − 2 − 3 5.5   0.25   2.5 5.5 
49 4 − 1 − 3 − 2 6  0.46  2.29 0.25  6 
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Figure 5. Matching of users and network nodes in 4-node network example with capacity. 
 
 
This test demonstrates how the stable matching assignment game can be applied to OD-level 
population groups in a network of routes that exhibit line capacities. The results show that a stable 
matching can be found along with a corresponding unique stable outcome space for determining 
stable cost allocations. Moreover, it shows how the core is dependent on different parameters of 
an example. 
 
 
4. Case study 
 
4.1. Experimental design 
 Having demonstrated how the model works, we now apply it to a case study calibrated to real 
data to illustrate the model in a more realistic setting as a proof-of-concept. We choose a taxi case 
study instead of a public transit one for several reasons: 
1) Taxi ridership data is readily available through the NYC Open Data portal. 
2) Taxi trips represent individual trips, and recent news about allowing shared rides (Hu, 
2017) suggests the question of demand for shared rides remains an open question that is of 
interest to policymakers. 
3) Tools to address this question have looked at either simulations that assume inelastic 
demand (Santi et al., 2014) or considered demand only for very specific trip purposes like 
airport access (Ma et al., 2017). Equilibrium assignment that considers both taxi operator 
and user incentives has not been conducted. 
 
We choose to study this problem as follows. A random sample of taxi riders is selected based 
on pickups and drop-offs during a particular time period in lower Manhattan. Two scenarios are 
defined; one in which only single rider taxi routes are used, and one in which ridesharing is an 
option. The single rider taxi data are used to calibrate the payoff values. We assume utilities are 
equal to the cost of the trips made in that base scenario. The assignment game model is expected 
to inform on: 
• Percent of users who choose to share rides considering incentives 
• Price allocations under two schemes: user-optimal and taxi-optimal allocation 
• Decision support for designing a cost allocation policy to request travelers meet the 
vehicles at a common distance 
 
Taxi operations are dynamic whereas our proposed model is a static model. To deal with this 
discrepancy, we carefully calibrate our base case such that representing the observed data with a 
static, multiperiod assignment would be stable. For more rigorous treatment of dynamic 
assignment, non-myopic assignment considerations with potential spillovers of requests (e.g. 
Sayarshad and Chow, 2015) and online cost allocations (Furuhata et al., 2015) would be needed, 
which are beyond the scope of this study. While this simplification and the small sample size 
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prevent us from drawing rigorous empirical conclusions about the shared taxi policy across the 
whole NYC, we can at least use the experiment to illustrate how the model can be used.  
 
4.2. Data 
NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission releases data every month on taxi trips in NYC. The 
data provides valuable information about each trip, such as pick up and drop off times and 
locations, trip distance, number of passengers, payment type and detailed fare data (fare + tax + 
tip). For this example, taxi data from Wednesday October 5th 2016 from 8AM to 8:30AM was 
used. There are 19,972 taxi trips made in NYC during this time. We consider the lower Manhattan 
region below 23rd Street as our study area, as shown in Figure 6. We create 21 nodes to represent 
zone centroids. Distance and travel time matrices between the nodes are extracted from Google 
API. 
 
 
Figure 6. Study area of NYC taxi case study. 
  
Within these 21 zones, 755 taxi trips were conducted during the study period. A set of potential 
routes are generated: single rider pickups and drop-offs as well as all possible combinations of two 
rider pickups and drop-offs. For each pair combination, the best route is generated. For example, 
two users 𝑓 and 𝑔 have origins and destinations (𝑂𝑓 , 𝐷𝑓) and (𝑂𝑔, 𝐷𝑔) respectively. The shortest 
travel route from the following set is added to the route set: {(𝑂𝑓 − 𝑂𝑔 − 𝐷𝑓 − 𝐷𝑔), (𝑂𝑓 − 𝑂𝑔 −
𝐷𝑔 − 𝐷𝑓), (𝑂𝑔 − 𝑂𝑓 − 𝐷𝑓 − 𝐷𝑔), (𝑂𝑔 − 𝑂𝑓 − 𝐷𝑔 − 𝐷𝑓)}. For each pair of users we have three 
routes. If |𝑆| is the number of users, the number of routes in this case study is |𝑅| = (|𝑆|
2
) ×
3
2
. 
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We break the study period into multiple time intervals Δ𝑇 and solve the problem as a static, 
multi-period assignment. In each interval, all the generated trips are pooled together and all the 
possible routes are generated to run the assignment model of Eq. (5) - (9). A Δ𝑇 is chosen to ensure 
that the static assignment problems within each interval contains non-empty stable outcomes in 
the base case. We initially assume Δ𝑇 equals 1 minute and keep dividing intervals with empty sets 
by two until the space of stable outcomes is non-empty. The same inferred stable intervals are used 
across the alternatives so that our comparison of single ride with shared ride policies is consistent. 
We find that an average stable interval length across the population of 46 seconds satisfies this 
objective. 
It is assumed that each person’s utility is equal to the travel time that they had in their observed 
single taxi ride plus the amount of fare they paid (which is known from the data). This utility is a 
lower bound of actual utility that each person has from doing his trip. This is a conservative choice 
for utility since these trips have already happened and if the actual utility was less, the user 
wouldn’t have made the trip in the first place. In the numerical example, it does matter for each 
user which route they choose. As a direct route, a single ride obviously will have less travel time 
(more payoff) than a shared ride that has some delay due to detour.  
In the numerical experiment of NYC taxi, the routes are explicitly generated beforehand. 
Based on generated routes the payoff value is independent of the user match (𝑥𝑠𝑟). There is no 
congestion effect from taxi rides on the road travel times – when a person chooses to ride one way 
or another, it will not impose crowding cost on another route at all (especially since taxis are only 
a small fraction of total traffic in lower Manhattan). The travel times do consider congested 
background traffic since the travel time matrices are drawn from Google API under the presence 
of congestion. Not considering congestion for shared taxi (and other fleet-oriented services) is 
normal and have been done in other shared ride studies (for a similar numerical example) such as 
Santi et al. (2013) and Alonso-Mora et al. (2017).  
We consider the line capacity of route links equal to three passengers (𝑤𝑟 = 3⁡, ∀⁡𝑟 ∈ 𝑅). Each 
taxi user is assumed to be a single passenger so 𝑞𝑠 = 1. All the cost and gain values are converted 
to monetary values. The value of time for travelling (TVOT) is assumed to be $0.40/min. The 
value of waiting time (WVOT) is assumed to be more than traveling value of time and is equal to 
twice that amount, $0.80/min. These values are conservative estimates based on numbers reported 
in Balcombe et al. (2004). Operating costs of routes are assumed to be $0.90/mile (based on an 
estimate of annual cost of $36,000 (including fixed and variable costs) and average annual mileage 
of 40,000 miles). 
 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1 Comparison of total shared taxi rides versus single taxi ride 
 All the calculations are performed with a desktop computer with core i7 @3.40 GHz processor 
and 8.0 GB RAM. All the codes are written in MATLAB 2016a. The full set of results for all 755 
users will be uploaded to GitHub (https://github.com/BUILTNYU) upon publication of this study. 
We run the assignment game model on this data for the shared ride policy with a run time of 
35.53 seconds. The total mileage of taxis for serving 755 users allowing shared rides is 1588.4 
miles, compared to a total mileage for single-ride taxi in the original data of 1996.9 miles. This 
shows a 21% decrease in vehicle miles traveled.  
Second, the assignment shows that 523 of 755 users (69%) decide to rideshare. This is similar 
but lower than the 80% estimate from Santi et al. (2014). Our value is more pessimistic because it 
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requires both users and operators to have sufficient incentive to switch. In Figure 7, the matches 
before (single taxi ride) and after (shared taxi ride allowed) matching taxi riders are shown. 
 
  
a) Single ride taxi b) Shared ride taxi 
Figure 7. NYC taxi assignment results for single and shared taxi riding. 
 
In Figure 8, the generalized ticket price in three conditions of single riding taxi data, user-
optimal shared taxi assignment, and operator-optimal shared taxi assignment are shown. The blue 
line represents the single ride taxi ticket price observed from the data. The red and green lines are 
ticket prices under operator- and user-optimal ticket pricing respectively (without minimum 
acceptable profit for operator and user). The space between these two lines is the space that a 
decision maker can use to evaluate stability of policies. With a positive minimum acceptable profit 
for users, the green and red lines would shift right, while a subsidy would shift them left.  
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Figure 8. Ticket price percentage of users pay in three different scenario. 
 
 
4.3.2 Illustration of cost allocation mechanism design using the stable cost allocation space 
The benefit of the proposed model is that the set of stable outcomes is a convex polyhedron, 
which means that any weighted average price between the user-optimal and operator-optimal ticket 
price for each user and operator is also a stable price that can be used. In fact, this method provides 
a tool for explicitly pricing or setting design constraints for cost allocation mechanisms rather than 
blindly finding prices. This tool is a powerful method for pricing any matching situation in 
transportation systems, of which the NYC taxi is one example. 
Consider the case of what happens if the shared ride taxi policy was incorporated with a fare 
price set at the user-optimal fare pricing level with the additional policy of requiring users to move 
up to a distance 𝐷 to be picked up. From the stable price space we know how much we can 
equivalently transfer operator cost to passenger cost without causing some users to break from the 
coalition. The total cost of the two minus the average operating cost savings per person should not 
exceed the operator optimal cost allocation.  
This model allows us to determine a good threshold for 𝐷. If 𝐷 = 1⁡𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘, assuming 1 mile 
is approximately 20 blocks, pedestrian walking speed is 4 ft/s, and value of time of walking is 
approximately 1.5 of in-vehicle time (Balcombe et al., 2004), then the policy can impose up to an 
average of $0.44 on each traveler. Let us look at the distribution of gaps between the operator- and 
user-optimal pricing in Figure 9. It shows if the operator does not reallocate any costs to users 
along with the policy, there are only 99 out of 755 travelers (13.1%) who would have enough gap 
to stably absorb the additional walking cost without having to reduce operating cost to compensate. 
For the remaining 86.9%, however, the average gap is $0.03. If we want to ensure that no passenger 
is turned away by the walking policy, (0.44⁡– ⁡0.03) ×
656
755
= $0.35 per user should be transferred 
to the users from the cost savings from rerouting the vehicles. This conclusion illustrates how the 
operator can define performance benchmarks to evaluate a routing algorithm that requires the 1-
block walking policy: e.g. one that saves less than $0.35 per user may not be stable without losing 
some users. The insight illustrates the strength of this modeling framework: for any general 
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transportation system with routes and line capacities, generalized cost allocation trade-offs 
between users and operators can be quantified and benchmarked for performance evaluation. 
 
 
Figure 9. Sorted gap between user- and operator-optimal pricing under shared taxi policy. 
 
 
4.3.3 Detailed breakdown for select trips 
Lastly, we look more closely at what happens to single users. As shown in Figure 10, three 
users with OD pairs (11,13), (17,20) and (20,13) originally conducted their trips as solo taxi rides 
based on the data. Because of the availability of shared rides, they are now incentivized to share 
their rides together with the route (𝟏𝟕 → 𝟏𝟏 → 𝟐𝟎 → 𝟏𝟑). For each of these users there are other 
available options such as sharing their ride with other users or even riding alone. 
The results for pricing users (11,13), (17,20) and (20,13) are shown in Table 7. In the single 
taxi riding condition, users (11,13), (17,20) and (20,13) are observed to pay $11.76, $6.30 and 
$8.15 respectively for their trips. The total profit of the operators from running these three trips is 
$8.34⁡ + ⁡$3.6⁡ + $7.34⁡ = ⁡$19.28.  
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Figure 10. Illustration of single taxi riding (dashed) versus ridesharing for two select users (solid). 
 
Table 7. Pricing of users (1,2) and (1,7) in single and ridesharing taxi riding 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ Results 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠 
 (11,13) (17,20) (20,13) 
𝑆
𝑖𝑛
𝑔
𝑙𝑒
⁡𝑡
𝑎
𝑥
𝑖⁡
𝑟𝑖
𝑑
𝑖𝑛
𝑔
 
1
→
6
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙⁡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒⁡(𝑚𝑖𝑛) 15   
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡($) 11.76   
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡⁡($) 0   
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡⁡($) 
(𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡– ⁡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) 
8.34  
 
5
→
1
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙⁡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒⁡(𝑚𝑖𝑛)  13  
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡($)  6.3  
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡⁡($)  0  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡⁡($) 
(𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡– ⁡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) 
 3.6 
 
5
→
6
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙⁡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒⁡(𝑚𝑖𝑛)   6 
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡($)   8.15 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡⁡($)   0 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡⁡($) 
(𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡– ⁡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) 
  
7.34 
𝑅
𝑖𝑑
𝑒𝑠
ℎ
𝑎
𝑟𝑖
𝑛
𝑔
⁡ 
𝑡𝑎
𝑥
𝑖⁡
𝑟𝑖
𝑑
𝑖𝑛
𝑔
 
1
→
2
→
7
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙⁡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒⁡(𝑚𝑖𝑛) 30 19 6 
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡($) 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟⁡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑏 + 9.34 𝑏+7.82 𝑏 + 3.13 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑏 + 9.35 𝑏 + 7.9 𝑏 + 3.15 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡⁡($) 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟⁡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 8.41 − 𝑏 3.67 − 𝑏 7.39 − 𝑏 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 8.40 − 𝑏 3.60 − 𝑏 7.41 − 𝑏 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡⁡($) 
(𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡– ⁡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡ 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟⁡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 3𝑏 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 0.1 + 3𝑏 
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In the ridesharing condition, one operator serves these three users by a single route of (𝟏𝟕 →
𝟏𝟏 → 𝟐𝟎 → 𝟏𝟑). Stability conditions from Section 3.2 lead to the values shown in the lower 
portion of Table 7. The value 𝑏 is assumed to be a constant minimum acceptable profit for these 
two operators (𝑏 < $3.6) that can serve these two users. For example, assuming 𝑏 = $3, the 
operator profit from operating one route will vary from $9 in user-optimal ticket pricing to $9.1 in 
operator optimal ticket pricing. These values compare to $8.34, $3.6 and $7.34 for each route in 
single riding taxi.  
Under the same assumption for 𝑏, user benefits for users (11,13), (17,20) and (20,13) would 
vary respectively from $9.34, $7.82 and $3.13 in operator-optimal ticket pricing to $9.35, $7.9 and 
$3.15 in user optimal ticket pricing condition. This value compares to the baseline of $0 in single 
taxi riding (since we set the utility to be the single ride cost). This quantification of the benefits 
can be used by public agencies to deploy pricing schemes to encourage people to shift to shared 
rides. 
 
4.4. Computational performance 
Like other capacitated multicommodity flow problems, the performance of the mixed integer 
programming solution method depends on the number of routes generated for each OD pair. In the 
assignment model of Eq. (5) - (9), for a set of 𝑛 unique user ODs, we have 𝑛 constraints (6), 
𝑛(3𝑛−1)
2
 
constraints (7), and 
𝑛(𝑛+1)
2
 constraints (8). So, for 𝑛 unique user OD pairs, we have constraints on 
the order of 𝑛2. With an increase in the number of unique user OD pairs, the number of constraints 
increases drastically. As suggested in section 3.3, one way to address this computational challenge 
is to introduce implicit enumeration using column generation (Barnhart et al., 1994), which we 
will examine more closely in future research. 
To provide a measure of the computational complexity of solving the assignment problem 
using mixed integer program without any decomposition, we tested the method on different 
numbers of unique user OD pairs. In a rectangular study area, we generated origin and destination 
locations for 𝑛 requests (in Euclidian space). In a similar process to section 4.2, for each OD pair, 
a set of potential routes are generated: single rider pickups and drop-offs as well as all possible 
combinations with other OD. For each pair combination, the best route is generated. For example, 
two OD pairs of 𝑓 and 𝑔 have origins and destinations (𝑂𝑓 , 𝐷𝑓) and (𝑂𝑔, 𝐷𝑔) respectively. The 
shortest travel route from the following set is added to the route set: {(𝑂𝑓 − 𝑂𝑔 − 𝐷𝑓 − 𝐷𝑔), (𝑂𝑓 −
𝑂𝑔 − 𝐷𝑔 − 𝐷𝑓), (𝑂𝑔 − 𝑂𝑓 − 𝐷𝑓 − 𝐷𝑔), (𝑂𝑔 − 𝑂𝑓 − 𝐷𝑔 − 𝐷𝑓)}. Figure 11 shows how the solution 
time and number of constraints increase with number of OD pairs.  
We can see that the solution time goes up exponentially while the number of constraints 
increases quadratically. This computational analysis confirms the need to explore decomposition 
algorithms in future research. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 11. (a) Solution time and (b) number of constraints of assignment problem for different number of unique OD 
pair. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There is currently no computational transportation assignment model for a broad class of 
mobility services in MaaS because existing models do not jointly model user and operator 
behavior. We propose a generalized assignment game model to overcome this problem, which has 
the potential to transform the transportation planning practice with a new quantitative tool for 
evaluating emerging mobility services in a smart cities era. We show that using this model has 
several benefits over the state of the art: 
• It is generalized prescriptive assignment methodology that is not restricted to just one type of 
mobility service and can handle both decentralized and centralized operators with line capacity 
effects. 
• Unlike most of the studies that assume a cost allocation policy or mechanism, the proposed 
model outputs a stable payoff space for post evaluation of cost allocation mechanisms. We 
show that decision-makers need to have either full control or partial control (through sequential 
design) of the assignment and cost allocation mechanisms to use the model for system design. 
• By considering the behavior and incentives of both users and operators, the model allows 
policymakers and operators to evaluate the stability and pricing (in general costs: fare, access, 
wait, transfer, in-vehicle time) requirements of operating policies and cost allocation 
mechanisms. 
• In the conventional assignment game, a user uses a whole product of a seller. In transportation, 
however, passengers may be matched only to sections of a route. This makes the stability 
condition of our proposed model markedly different from prior assignment games. In section 
3.2 the stability principles for this proposed model are derived.  
 
We examined our model through several different examples. The first set of examples deal 
with a 4-node fixed route transit network. The last set of examples investigates a case study 
calibrated from real NYC taxi data as a proof-of-concept to illustrate the proposed methodology. 
Using the proposed model, we assigned taxi users to share their cab with a range of stable pricing. 
In this study with 755 trips from downtown Manhattan, we showed that 69.3% (523 trips) of users 
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are willing to share their taxis. Ridesharing of this 69.3% of users decreases the vehicle miles 
traveled by 20.5%.  
Several directions for future research are possible. The model can be extended to consider 
routes having to share limited space with congestion effects. Generally, the focus of MaaS systems 
is on vehicle and line capacity, but certainly in highly congested cities with limited space and very 
large fleets it is important to study the congestion effects that different operators have on each 
other based on serving travelers.  For example, in NYC there is consideration of a surcharge on 
taxis and for-hire vehicles because they crowd the streets which slow down bus routes. 
A second issue to consider is route enumeration. The model assumes matching users to 
operator routes, which requires having operator routes beforehand. This is a problem in the line 
planning literature as well. Solutions include using heuristics (Ceder and Wilson, 1986) and 
column generation methods (Barnhart et al., 1994; Borndörfer et al., 2007) to generate routes. 
Future research may consider endogenous equilibration of the route set as well (e.g. as studied by 
Watling et al., 2015, and Rasmussen et al., 2015). 
A third potential future study is dynamic assignment. The current methodology and examples 
deal with static assignment games, even though dynamic assignment would be more appropriate 
for some analysis. We know that several ridesharing companies currently need dynamic 
assignment since their demand is not known in advance. As a result, an interesting direction for 
future studies can be also considering stable matching and its dynamic pricing that considers 
sequential cost allocations (e.g. Gopalakrishnan et al., 2016).  
The model can be used to evaluate flexible route decisions for multimodal transit services. 
Instead of matching a user’s OD pair to a portion of an operator’s route, we can match portions of 
operator routes to portions of a user’s route, allowing for truly multimodal assignment. In those 
cases, the operators may have to cooperate by considering cost transfers with each other (e.g. fare 
bundles) to serve the passengers. This becomes a many-to-many assignment game like in 
Sotomayor (1999), but with line capacity effects on top of that. 
With the increasing devastation of catastrophic disasters, it has become necessary to be better 
prepared for these kinds of events. For future studies, we will also consider stochastic scenarios 
for risk pooling (cost allocations between operators) in the case of such events. 
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Appendix. Model variations 
Variations can be modeled. For example, direct services like taxis may be represented by 
single link routes with some dynamic filtering of available routes. A route can also be replaced 
with a cycle without altering the model. If the operator is a single centralized decision-maker, then 
the matching would be made between the set of users with a single seller. Operators may be toll 
road operators, public transport providers, taxis, or TNCs, among others mentioned earlier. The 
following sections describe how centralized decision-making and vehicle-route framework can be 
modeled. 
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A.1. Operator-route case 
Although the base model assumes each operator is a separate route, it is also possible to 
consider operators as collections of routes, or even as a system-wide centralized agency. This 
section demonstrates how that can be accomplished using our underlying model.  
In the centralized case, as before, set 𝑃 represents the set of operators. Operator 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 owns 
the set of routes to operate (𝑅𝑝). 𝑂(𝑟) is the operator that owns route 𝑟 (e.g. 𝑂(𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑝) = 𝑝).  In 
a decentralized situation, each operator owns only one route. The main assignment model (5) - (9) 
remains valid for the centralized case because users and routes would be matched to the routes that 
generate maximum payoff together. The key difference between the centralized and decentralized 
case is in their stability definitions.  
A modification is made to the stability defined by the convex area in Eq. (29) to (33). In a 
centralized case, the stability related to different operators (as opposed to different routes) should 
be checked. While an operator wants to make sure that their users won’t switch to another 
operator’s route, they don’t mind if their user switches to a different route belonging to the same 
operator. This is a looser stability condition which can be obtained by replacing Eq. (29) with Eq. 
(34). The set of stable outcomes in this case includes the stable outcomes that are defined in 
decentralized case. 
 
∑ 𝑢𝑠𝑠∈𝐺𝑟 + 𝑣𝑟 ≥ ∑ 𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑠∈𝐺𝑟 − 𝐶𝑟  
∀𝐺𝑟⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 
∃𝑠 ∈ 𝐺𝑟: 𝑂(𝑟) ≠ 𝑂(𝐶(𝑠, 𝑥)) 
(34) 
 
In Eq. (34), stability is checked to ensure a user cannot generate more payoff with a route of another 
operator. This change ensures the stability over different operators. This variant can be used to 
model either centralized operators with multiple routes or exogenous coalitions of operators. 
Handling endogenous coalition formation between operators would require extending this model 
to include network flow games, which we reserve for future research. 
 
A.2. Operator-vehicle-route case 
We introduce another variation of the model under the operator-route case. We model a market 
where operators own a fleet of vehicles. Set 𝑃 represents the set of operators. Operator 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 owns 
a set of vehicles (𝑉𝑝∈𝑃) with which to operate from a set of candidate paths. For example, a train 
can be operated along certain paths and a taxi vehicle can be operated along different paths at 
different times. In this case the two sides of the market are users and vehicle-paths. Let’s call 𝑟𝑝𝑖 
the set of candidate paths for vehicle 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑝. 𝑅𝑝 is the set of candidate paths for all the fleet of 
operator 𝑝 (⋃ 𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑖∈𝑉𝑝 = 𝑅𝑝). The assignment model of Eq. (5) - (9) remains the same for this 
vehicle based system except it needs one more set of constraints (Eq. (35)). For each 𝑟𝑝𝑖 set, a 
maximum of one (non-k) path is chosen (i.e. each vehicle cannot have more than one 𝑟 where 
𝑥𝑘𝑟 = 0 because that implies more than one path operating at the same time per vehicle). 
 
∑ (1 − 𝑥𝑘𝑟)
𝑟∈𝑟𝑝𝑖
≤ 1 ⁡∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑝, ∀𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 (35) 
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Another modification that should be made for this case is related to the stability conditions. 
Since the introduced case of this section is a centralized decision making system, the stability 
equations of Eq. (34) should be used instead of Eq. (29). 
  
A.3. Example of operator-vehicle-path case 
A 3-node network is considered. The network is identical to the 4-node network of Section 
3.4.1 but without the 4th node. The link costs are in units of operating miles. There are two 
operators, each with a fleet of 2 vehicles, and each vehicle has a passenger capacity of 2. The initial 
locations of the fleets are node 1 for operator 1 and node 3 for operator 2. The vehicle speeds are 
40⁡𝑚𝑝ℎ. The set of users’ OD is 𝑆 = {(1,2), (1,3), (2,3), (3,2)}. The utility of all passengers is set 
to the value of $20 (𝑈𝑠𝑟 = 20$⁡∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆\{𝑘}, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅). The value of time is $0.4/min and cost of 
operation to $0.9/mile. The direct cost that each passenger experiences is the waiting time plus 
travel time. Waiting time is multiplied by 1.25. Operator 1’s vehicles each have 6 candidate paths 
𝑟1𝑖∈𝑉1 = {(1 → 2), (1 → 3), (1 → 2 → 3), (1 → 3 → 2), (1 → 2 → 3 → 1), (1 → 3 → 2 → 1)}. 
Operator 2’s vehicles have 5 candidate paths 𝑟1𝑖∈𝑉2 = {(3 → 2), (3 → 1 → 2), (3 → 2 → 1), (3 →
1 → 2 → 3), (3 → 2 → 1 → 3)}. The results of assignment and ticket prices is shown in the Table 
A1. 
 
Table A1. Results of assignment and payoff allocation in centralized case 
 Chosen path 
User (O,D) 
(1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (3,2) 
Vehicle 1 of operator 1 1 − 2 − 3 1 1 1  
Vehicle 1 of operator 2 3 − 2    1 
Waiting time (min) 0 0 4.5 0 
Travel time (min) 4.5 7.5 3 3 
User optimal ticket price 1.5 + 𝑏1 1.5 + 𝑏1 1.5 + 𝑏1 1.8 + 𝑏1 
Operator optimal ticket price 5.55 + 𝑏2 − 𝑏1 2.25 + 𝑏2 − 𝑏1 8.55 + 𝑏2 − 𝑏1 1.8 + 𝑏1 − 𝑏2 
 
Based on Table A1, Vehicle 1 of Operator 1 is assigned to path 1 → 2 → 3 to serve passengers 
(1,2), (1,3)⁡and⁡(2,3). Vehicle 1 of Operator 2 is assigned to path 3 → 2 to serve the passenger 
(3,2). 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 are the minimum acceptable profits for Operators 1 and 2. The operator-optimal 
ticket price for a passenger is a function of the minimum acceptable profit by the matched 
operators. For a smaller value of rival operator acceptable profit, the operator would charge their 
passenger less to keep the coalition stable.  
Minimum acceptable profit is a policy making tool for operators to compete in a market. For 
example, sometimes the operator loses some gains over some routes to compete on other routes in 
different timetables. A newcomer operator to a market may want to penetrate the market by 
maximizing the number of matches initially without concern for profit. In this context, even 
negative values for minimum acceptable profit have economic interpretation.  
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